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The Scope and Effect of the
1926 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act
JAMES J. RoBINSON*-
"It is the best bill we can pass at this time. It makes for honesty,
it makes for economy, it makes for equality among creditors." In
these words, on the floor of the House of Representatives, on April 17,
1926, Congressman Earl C. Michener, of Michigan, defended the bill
which on August 27, 1926, after subsequent amendments became
effective in amendment, of the Bankruptcy. Act of X898.1 Almost
the sole opponent of the bill was. a "gentleman, from Texas," who
described himself as "not a bankruptcy. lawyer", although, he added,
"I may be a, bankrupt lawyer." 2 The vote was-yeas 276, nays 17.
The Amendments are the work of the Am6rican Bar Association, the
National Association of Credit Men, the Commercial Law League
of America, the Judiciary Committees of the House and_ Senate, -and
other bodies. The American Bar Association, at.its annual meeting
in 1923 had followed the recommendation of Chief Justice Taft and
others by creating a Special Committee on Practi'e'inBankruptcy
Matters, to recommend amendments to the Bankruptcy Law de-
signed to "bring about a cessation of the frauds and abuses that are
complained of under the present pra6tice." 3 Mr. Simon Fleisch-
mann, of Buffalo, N.Y., as chainnari of that committee, shares with
Mr. Michener, of the House Committee on judiciary, chief individual
credit for the present amendments.
The amendments are concerned chiefly with promoting the equal
and economical distribution of the debtor's preperty among his
creditors. The other object of bankruptcy legislation, namely, the
relief of the honest debtor from his misforte,, was regarded as
substantially secured by the original act. The sponsors of the Amend-
ments state that while the amendments strengthen ihe Act, they still
leave the success of the Bankruptcy Act substantially and principally
dependent upon its administration, 'that is, .upon ihe integrity,
watchfulness and ability of the judges, referees, trustees, receivers,
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
l(1926) 67 Cong. Rec. 768o.
2(1926) 67 Cong. Rec: 7680. -.
3(1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 95.
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attorneys, and others upon whom the administration of the Act
rests.
4
Those who heard the report of Chairman Fleischmann, at Detroit,
on September 3, 1925, at the Annual Meeting of the AmericanBar
Association, may remember his summary of the proposed bill, now
enacted in largely the same form as it was then presented. We
shall here consider the Amendments in substantially the same order
in which he summarized them.
"We have increased," said Chairman Fleischmann, "the number
and nature and seriousness of objections to discharge in the case of
dishonest bankruptcies, including the more serious consequences
resulting from failure to keep proper books of account."5 Section 14
deals with Discharges,-When Granted. Section 14 (a) is amended
so that it ends disagreement among the courts on the question:
During what period after adjudication may the bankrupt file his
application for discharge? This question is now definitely answered
as follows: During the period from the 2d to the i2th month, both
inclusive. There is no longer room for the dispute that thebankrupt
also has the 13 th month after adjudication in which to file his appli-
cation for discharge.
Sec. 14 (b) is amended to extend the grounds upon which the judge
may refuse to discharge the applicant. Subdivision (i) prevents dis-
charge if the applicant has "committed an offense punishable by
imprisonment as herein provided." While not amended, this sub-
division is enlarged in scope by the amendments to section 29 increas-
ing the number of bankruptcy offenses punishable by imprisonment.
Subdivision (2) may prevent discharge if the applicant has destroyed
or failed to keep books of account: Before amendment, it required
such acts to be done "with intent to conceal his financial condition";
by the amendinent, such intent is not specifically mentioned, and
the court is given power to disregard such acts or neglect if the facts
of the case justify them. Subdivision (3) now denies discharge where
the applicant gets money or property or additional credit by publish-
ing or causing to be published, in any manner whatsoever, a material-
ly false statement in writing about his financial condition. Before
amendment, this subdivision failed to prevent discharge if the appli-
cant made his false statements through commercial agencies. Sub-
division (4) now denies discharge if the applicant during the 12
months preceding the filing of the petition had transferred or con-
cealed any of his-property, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his
4(1926) 67 Cong. Rec. 7679; (1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 97.-
5(1925) Rep. An. Bar Assn., 97.
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creditors. The former limit was 4 months. That period was found
to be too short and was therefore lengthened to 12 months. Sub-
division (5) now omits the words "involuntary proceedings," so that
now in both voluntary proceedings and involuntary proceedings, no
applicant can get a discharge within six years of a previous discharge.
This amendment bars the habitual or chronic bankrupt from bringing
"involuntary" bankruptcy upon himself to avoid the -six-year limita-
tion formerly applicable to voluntary proceedings alone. Subdi-
vision (6) still denies discharge to an applicant who has refused to
obey court orders or to answer questions approved by the court.
Subdivision (7) is new. By it the judge denies discharge if the appli-
cant has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or defi-
ciency of assets to meet his liabilities.
To sec. 14 (b) is then added an important proviso which puts upon
the applicant the burden of proving that he has not committed any
of the seven acts just enumerated, such burden to arise as soon as an
objector to the discharge shall show to the satisfaction of the court
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has
committed any of the seven acts. The Amended Act retains the
further proviso that a trustee shall not object to the discharge except
upon authorization of creditors. An effort was made to remove this
restriction.
The next statement by the committee's spokesman was: "We
have unified the times within which appeals must be taken, and I
think in most cases have shortened it, so that bankrupt estates may
be more promptly closed." Secs. 24 and 25 deal with appeals.
Sec. 24 (b) is amended to end confusion by abolishing petitions to
revise or to review, and by making the method of review solely by
appeal. A new sub-section, 24 (c), requires that all appeals under
sec. 24 shall be taken within 3o days after the judgment, or order, or
other matter complained of, has been rendered or entered. Sec. 25 is
then correspondingly amended to make the period for appeal 30
days, instead of io days. This uniformity. is designed to end con-
fusion and conflicts of authority on the subject of the proper time for
appeals.6
The Committee's spokesman next emphasized a group of amend-
ments to section 29, saying: "We have increased the number of
criminal offenses and the punishments of those directly and indirectly
associated ivith any fraud in connection with going into and through
For opinion that this has not been accomplished, see Colin, An Analysis of
the x926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. (1926) 26 COL. LAW REV. 789, at
796.
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bankruptcy." Subsection (a) of section 29 formerly provided im-
prisonment not to exceed five years for embezzling the property or
secreting the documents of a bankrupt estate by a trustee. By the
Amendment, such penalty is also extended to the receiver, custodian
or other officer of the court. Subsection (b) of section 29 raises the
maximum term of imprisonment from two to five years, for the
following enumerated offenses, the number of which is raised from
five to eight. Sec. 29 (b) (i) forbids concealment of property belong-
ing to the estate of a bankrupt, and is now so amended that it
covers not only concealment by the bankrupt or his agent, as former-
ly limited,7 but concealment by anyone; and is now amended so
that it covers not only concealment from the trustee, as formerly
limited, but also concealment from the receiver, United States
Marshal, or other officer of the court in charge of the property, or
creditors in composition cases. Section 29 (b) (5) is amended to
forbid, not technical "extortion" as formerly, but receiving or at-
tempting to obtain compensation for acting or not acting in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The three new offenses are: sec. 29 (b) (6)
forbids an officer or agent of the debtor to conceal or transfer any of
the debtor's property, in contemplation of bankruptcy, or with
intent to defeat the Act; section 29 (b) (7) forbids the concealment,
after the filing of the petition, or in contemplation of bankruptcy, of
any book, etc., relating to the bankrupt's affairs; and section 29 (b)
(8) forbids the withholding, from the receiver or trustee, after the
filing of the petition, of any book or paper relating to the bankrupt's
affairs, and to possession of which he is entitled. Experience is said
to have shown the need for the creation of such new offenses.
Criminal prosecutions of bankruptcy offenders are further aided
by an extension of the statute of limitations from one year, to three
years after the commission of the offense[Sec. 29 (d)]. This extension
is expected to discourage the present one-year sojourns, out of the
jurisdiction, of fraudulent bankrupts.
Finally, a new subsection (e), directs the referee, receiver, or trustee
to report to the proper United States Attorney facts coming to his
attention and reasonably indicating that an offense against the Act
has been committed. The United States attorney is directed then
to present the matter to the Grand Jury, or to the Attorney General
for his direction.
And finally, the Committee's spokesman, on the occasion referred
to, emphasized one other principal group of amendments, in these
7Kauffman v. U. S., 212 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2nd 1914); Good v. Kane, 211 Fed.
956.
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words: "We have re-arranged, and I believe, improved the regu-
lation of priorities, in the distribution of assets and the payment of
taxes, in the interest of creditors. The measures include the abolish-
ing of priority of payment of taxes, (and) of residents, or corporations
of a given state, to the prejudice, and as against the claims of, credit-
ors for like claims of other states."
But the Senate amended the bill by striking out that proviso which
was designed to abolish the priorities of residents and domestic cor-
porations of a given state.8 Section 64, of course, fixes the priorities
of those getting property from the bankrupt estate ahead of the
general creditors. The American Bar Association's Special Bank-
ruptcy Committee recommended that section 64 (b) (7) read as
follows: "(7) debts owing to any person who by the laws of the
States or the United States is entitled to priority; Provided, how-
ever, that priorities granted by any state law to its residents and to
domestic corporations over non-residents and foreign corporations
shall not be recognized or allowed."9  The committee said, "The
reasons for this amendment grow out of the fact that there is now
existing in Tennessee, and, perhaps, in other states, a statute which
provides that resident creditors shall have priority in distribution
of assets over residents of other states or countries. The U. S.
Supreme Court held this act unconstitutional, except in so far as it
related to foreign corporations, with the result that a foreign corpo-
ration, doing business in Tennessee, is subordinated to all the Tennes-
see creditors, as was held in Standard Oak Veneer Co., (173 Fed. 103)
(i9o9). Clearly such an unfair discrimination and preferential
outcome should not be perpetuated or left possible."' 0
But, the form of section 64 (b) (7) in the Amended Act is as follows:
"(7) debts owing to any person who by the laws of the states or
the United States is entitled to priority: Provided, That the term
'person' as used in this section shall include corporations, the United
States, and the several states and territories of the United States."
This amended provision is the original clause section 64 (b) (5),
plus the proviso. Some of the questions raised by the present amend-
ed subdivision and proviso, are: does not this proviso perpetuate,
rather than abolish, the home-state discrimination which we may call
the "Tennessee evil?" As to making the term "person" include
"corporations," why merely repeat the same provision of sec. i (a)
(I) ? As to making the term "person" include "the United States
8(1926) 67 Cong. Rec. 96Io.
o(i925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 502.
10(1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 49I.
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and the several states," do we not have a conflict with the preceding
subdivision, 64 (b) (6), which expressly, and more broadly provides
for the priority of taxes due the "United States, state, county, district
or municipality?" It has also been suggested that the proviso is an
unwarranted legislative repudiation of the law as recently laid down
by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Pringle and Borland v.
United States, 268 U. S. 315, 45 Sup. Ct. 549 (1925).11
The confusion raised by this Proviso is especially unfortunate,
because of the specific abuse being "left possible," and also because
the Amendments otherwise bid fair to end the old confusion as to
what priority was due taxes owing by the bankrupt estate.
Sec. 64 (a) is amended to show clearly that taxes are payable,
under subsection (b), after expenses of the proceedings and wages.
The amendment also exempts real estate of the bankrupt estate from
taxes in excess of the actual interest, or equity, of the bankrupt
estate in such real estate. This makes for fairness to the general
creditors. Sec. 64 (b) (3) now allows an attorney's fee to the in-
voluntary bankrupt, as well as to the voluntary bankrupt as hereto-
fore. Sec. 64 (b) (4) is a new subdivision, empowering the court in
its discretion to allow reasonable expenses to creditors who have
successfully opposed a composition. The Committee's reason for
this priority was to encourage the defeat of dishonest compositions.
But the amendment fails to indicate that dishonest compositions par-
ticularly are meant. Perhaps the courts will exercise their discretion
so as to limit such relief to such cases, so that this provision will not
become a "two-edged sword," as some critics fear.2 Sec. 64 (b)
(5) increases the maximum priority for wages from three hundred
dollars to six hundred dollars, as maintaining relative proportions
between the values of 1898 and of 1926.
Important procedural changes also include the reduction of the
time for proving claims against a bankrupt estate from the former
limit of one year after the adjudication, to six months after the
adjudication. [Sec. 57 (n).] The object of this amendment is simply
to hasten the closing up of the proceeding.
Another procedural change is that the voluntary bankrupt is no
longer required to file with his petition a schedule of his property and a
list of his creditors. He now has io days after filing his petition
within which to file such schedule and list, just as the involuntary
bankrupt has io days after adjudication to do the same. Sec. 7
(a) (8).
"See Coln, op. cit. supra, at 804.1 2Cook, Analysik of New Bankruptcy Law, (1926) 2 Am. BKRCY. REV. 324.
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Some of the other changes in the Act made by-the. 1926 Amend-
ments, are the following: The definition of "corporations" in sec.
i (a) (6) is expanded to include common-law trusts and unincor-
porated companies and associations. Changes in territorial status,
or in the federal system of courts, are provided for in sec. i (a) (8),
(24); sec. 2; sec. 23; sec. 24, and sec. 25.. Changes as to patents
appear in sec. 70.
. A new Act of bankruptcy is created in see. 3 (a) (4), to overcome
the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Citizens Banking
Co. v. Ravenna National Bank,13 which held that a creditor might get
a lien and do nothing toward sale under it until it had ripened into
a preference.
As to expenses, such as stenographic help, more discretion is
placed in the court, and an arbitrary and outgrown price lim'it is
abolished in see. 38 (a) (5).
Sec. 21 (h) establishes a privilege and immunity for good-faith
communications between creditors, receivers, and trustees concerning
the conduct, acts or property of the bankrupt. Its object is to
facilitate full investigation and conference.
Another provision designed to speed up the proceedings is the
Amendment of see. 12 (a). The old law required that if an offer of
composition was filed, action on the petition for adjudication should
automatically be delayed until the composition was acted upon.
This led to delay, waste and to the filing of "sham" offers of compo-
sition. The 1926 amendment provides that the filing of such offers
before adjudication shall not delay action on the petition for adjudi-
cation, subject to the discretion of the court.
One difficult question remains. In case the bankrupt or prospec-
tive bankrupt makes a preferential transfer of his property, and the
transferee delays in recording such transfer, should the power of the
creditor or of the trustee to proceed to recover part or all of such
property be limited by the time of the transfer, or by the time of the
recording of the transfer? And what difference does it make whether
the statute of the particular state requires recording or merely permits
recording of such transfers? If the actual recording of the transfer
is the first notice which the creditor or trusted has received of the
preferential transfer, as may often be the case, should not the four
months' statute of limitations begin to run against the creditor or
trustee from the recording, rather than from the theretofore unknown
transfer?
These questions have been dealt with somewhat iaconsistently by
the Bankruptcy Act, and it is not easily determined how much the
13234 U. S. 360 (1914).
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Amendment of section 6o (a) has cleared up the matter. By sec.
3 (b) where such transfer is anact of bankruptcy, the creditor may
file his petition at .any time within four months after the recording
of the transfer "if by law such recording or registering is required
or permitted." But'after the bankrupt has thereby been thrown
into bankruptcy, the trustee, under sec. 6o -(b), has had no power to
recover the property so transferred if he sought to proceed within
four months of the recording in a jurisdiction where such recording
was not required but was merely permitted.14 The Bankruptcy
Committee believed that the four months' period during which
the trustee might recover the preference should begin to run when
such recording is permitted as well as when it is required. 5 They,
therefore, added the words, "or permitted" to sec. 6o (a), which
defines a preference. They did not add the words "or permitted"
after the word "required" in sec. 6o (b) which is the section from
which the trustee gets his power to recover property transferred by
way of such preference. Does this omission leave the Committee's
object largely unrealized, for the rxeason that it merely enlarges the
definition of a preference, without enlarging correspondingly the
power of the trustee to set aside such a preference? It is sometimes
stated that sec. 6o (a) and sec. 6o (b) are to be read together, but it
would be difficult to say that such an interpretation on this point is
supported by the weight of authority.
The Amendatory Act was- approved May 27, 1926, and by its
terms went into effect on August 27, 1926. It readily appears that
many of the amendments are improvements of the Bankruptcy Act.
Some of the amendments proposed by the American Bar Association
committee which deserved enactment as proposed, did not pass.
And some of -the Amendments -will. require interpretation by the
courts before we know their effect.
The 1926 Amendments -are remarkable in several respects. They
check the under-current in Congress in favor of repealing the entire
Bankruptcy Act.'7 And for the first time in the history of proposed
extensive bankruptcy amendments, a united front was presented by
national legal and commercial organizations' 8 Their success in
Congress is a-valuable precedent. And finally, both the bench and
the bar are encouraged now to -continue their concerted efforts in
improving the administration of the Bankruptcy Act.
14Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916).
15(1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 489.
16See Carey v. Donohue, supra note 14; Martin v. Commercial Nat'l. Bank,
245 U. S., 513 (1918); REEMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY. (3d ed. 1923) § § 1790,
1791, S. C. et seg. Also see §57 (g) of the Act which bases voidability 9f such
preferences upon sitbdiv. b. of section'60.
17(1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 96.
18(1925) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 97.
